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>>18516886
>Why would a georgian divorcee mugger who bullied his son into suicide kill the people under him at random this doesn't make sense
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>>18516886
The Who Whom (ктo кoгo) problem. Class struggle doesn't stop with revolution but actually intensifies. When the revolution first suceeds capitalism is still very strong and socialism very weak and thus a struggle occurs throughout the country. To avoid a Thermidor sitaution dissenting remnants of the old order must be actively attacked. With the military defeat of the attempt at restoring capitalism, the right wing elements of society become wreckers and infiltrate the party as oppritunists and sabateuors who try to destroy the party from within and restore capitalism. Stalin understood this as a wise student of Lenin and made numerous polemics and managed to convince the party to expel the opposition of Trotsky and Zinoviev in 1927 at the 15th congress of the CPSU(b) due to their years of sabatoge, Menshevik policies, ecclecticism and lying and arrogance.
And it was precisely this rejection of who whom that occurred during de-stalinization under Kruschev (student of Trotsky) that the global communist movement would faulter and eventually fail to prevent the restoration of capitalism.
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>>18516886
Stalin was a retard with pathological-grade paranoia.
Inexplicably this paranoia did not extend to Hitler, which resulted in Stalin somehow being genuinely blindsided by Hitler's sudden yet inevitable betrayal.
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>>18517690
>Inexplicably this paranoia did not extend to Hitler
it's entirely explainable; he was in denial. Stalin to his credit knew full well that the USSR wasn't ready to face down Germany militarily in mid-1941 without suffering catastrophic and/or fatal damage and almost everything he did after he started losing the proxy war to the Axis in Spain in 1938 was to desperately buy time while the USSR beefed up its fighting strength. Same reason he crashed the fuck out when he saw how quickly France collapsed.
He wasn't naive whatsoever about Germany; the entire point and aim of Soviet Bolshevik ideology was that they would inevitably eventually fight major wars against the Central and Western European capitalist-imperialist powers. But to accept that the Soviet military, which was still in a quite half-baked organizational/doctrinal state in the late spring of 1941, would have to face down 150 Wehrmacht divisions way too soon for comfort, was too unnerving to contemplate. If you had told Stalin in 1940 with confidence that Hitler was planning to launch Barbarossa in 1950 instead of 1941 and the USSR would have another decade to arm up and prepare, he probably would have believed it readily.
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>>18517690
He got conflicting information. Some reports told him that he was going to invade, with the exact date of the invasion included, others told him he would not. While history remembers the incredibly accurate warnings (like those from master spy Richard Sorge or the top-secret British Ultra intercepts), Stalin also received dozens of reports claiming the invasion was a British disinformation campaign designed to provoke a war between Germany and the USSR.
Intelligence sources kept predicting different dates for the invasion (April, May, then June). When earlier dates passed without an attack, it reinforced Stalin's belief that the warnings were mostly psychological warfare or "provocations."
He also made the mistake of thinking that Hitler was a rational actor. Stalin viewed Hitler not as an ideological fanatic driven by racial destiny (Lebensraum), but as a calculating, ruthless pragmatic politician, much like himself. Stalin believed Hitler would never commit the ultimate strategic blunder: a two-front war. Because Great Britain was still undefeated in the West, Stalin assumed Hitler’s massive troop buildup on the Soviet border was merely a muscle-flexing tactic to extort massive economic concessions (like more oil and grain) from the USSR without having to fight for them.
The pre-war plans and wargames gave Stalin a dangerously false sense of security about how the war would play out. The Soviet High Command Strategic War Games of January 1941: These were massive, map-based simulations ordered by Stalin to test how the Red Army would fare against a Western invader (clearly meaning Nazi Germany).
The takeaway Stalin took from it was: "If Germany invades, we might lose some ground initially, but our superior numbers and immediate counter-attacks will easily crush them and bring the war into Europe."
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>>18516886
It's the puzzle of the 20th century.
If I had to take a guess I would say that, just like the Nazis were murdering "non-Aryans" (and not perfectly healthy at that) because of their vision of an ethno-state, Stalin decided to remove from high positions anybody who he deemed a non-perfect communist; for a similar vision of a communist paradise. Murder was "necessary" because simply removing them from power would just create a group of disgruntled and potentially influential people.
If loyalty to the very Stalin himself was in question or somebody had his own political ambitions then killing such person would be a no-brainer for him as well.