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What did the germans, italians and soviets learn from their involvement in the spanish civil war?
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to never do anything with spanish people again
>even at war all they do is sleeping
>all those who fought were foreigners
>the communist side was such a shithole one man made two novels about it to warn others how bad this shit is when handed to the wrong people
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>>65060292
t.
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>>65060263
It was all pretty minor, but also pretty important. Lots of little details about tank design, doctrine, airplane doctrine, etc.
German's armored meme didn't come out of nowhere, interwar tanks were a mess and every major power was making mistakes in some capacity. Spanish Civil War helped the Axis sort out theirs.
>Soviets
They learned absolutely nothing because they lost hard.
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>>65060263
Germans learned that the flak 18 in the hands of a spanish atilleryman:
>"No, we are not running away because enemy tanks coming from the flank, we have a gun."
>"What do you mean is an anti air gun?, I have a BIG gun"
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>>65060263
>germans
pretty much shaped modern fighter and CAS doctrine
>soviets
guerilla movements need massive state-sponsored supply chains to work, and then they'll work even better than invading the country yourself
>italians
war bad, coffee good
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>>65060537
>pretty much shaped modern fighter and CAS doctrine
lolno, absolutely not even close to right on either count. The main thing the Germans learned about CAS was the incorrect belief that every aircraft needed to be a dive bomber, which proceeded to hamstring their aircraft designs right up to their banana empire surrendering.
What the Germans actually learned was that radios were the key interwar development in military technology. They correctly deduced that the effect of radios would be to create opportunities to increase operational tempo, that centralised control was no longer fit for interaction with the tactical level of war and that orchestration would be enhanced but only if it were decentralised. It followed from this that everything needed radios and junior decision makers needed to be empowered to make tactical decisions quickly, and that standardised control measures needed to be developed.
But like, feel free to never read any books by interwar or WWII German military thinkers and spout some Wehraboo bullshit on the internet.
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>>65060710
wdym
>pseudo-strategic
and
>Ju 52 was capable of
?
a B-17 could carry nearly 3 times the bomb load of a Ju-52
the Luftwaffe went all-in on close air support of ground offensives at the expense of virtually every other air combat mission
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>>65060263
>Facists (Germans/Italians)
They learned tactics and what worked/didn't work
>communists (Russia mainly)
They learned the belief of "communsim in one country" as anarchists and moderates caused chaos in the republican force
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>>65061257
>Learned the wrong lessons on the effectiveness of "terror bombing"
yes
"it works really well" is what they took away, when the lesson had the important caveat: "when the enemy has no air force"
it's quite interesting to read that during the interwar period there was discussion to ban strategic bombing in much the same way we talk about banning nuclear bombs today. the Spanish War would have looked like a small nuke exchange that quickly compelled capitulation today.
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>>65061304
>1940
I think the mis-learning from the SCW was more impactful because by 1940 it was probably too late to design and produce a strategic bomber to blitz London with, whereas there was still time in 1937 and 1938
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>>65060765
It's the other way round. The Soviets were not there to help anyone or be helped, the Soviets were there to take over Spain and install a puppet regime. Their behavior and objectives were why Orwell, an avid socialist, became such an outspoken anti-communist.
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>>65061257
>another tryhard
Spain was a Blitzkrieg proving ground by parts. Aircraft, combined arms ground maneuver, battlefield medicine. Nothing there had anything to do with Russia, dumbass. All the lessons worked. Until your favorite bloodthirsty lunatic started fucking it all up with egotistical, (later, drug-fueled paranoid) micromanagement well outside of his skillset.
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>>65061375
>Until your favorite bloodthirsty lunatic started fucking it all up with egotistical, (later, drug-fueled paranoid) micromanagement well outside of his skillset.
This is just surviving generals trying to place all blame on Hitler. They were the ones to primarily fuck things up, which is precisely why Hitler started taking command himself. His micromanagement really kicked in after Stalingrad, when the failure of the war was becoming apparent.
He had a superior strategic understanding compared to many of his generals. E.g. Halder going for Moscow when Germany didn't even have enough fuel to get there.
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>>65060689
I hate this piece of shit mural so goddamn much. It's such a piece of rancid dogshit, with the onlyt thing propping it up being inane sentimentalism's about "muh tragedy" and "muh Basque heritage". Fucking idiotic loony-tunes looking trash.
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>>65062397
Stalingrad IS the point where Hitler started micromanaging and where Stalin stopped micromanaging.
It's the very specific point where point sides finally understood the way the war was going and had adopted to it fully.
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>>65060314
I read a while back that his family was close friends with Arthur Stoll, the man who later helped Alfred Hoffmann develop LSD, so Junger may have just been tripping his balls off on experimental drugs the whole war, which would explain why he had such a great time.
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>>65060324
All Quiet seems like it's the perspective of the average solider who didn't have much choice about going to war and their experience, there also the Road Back is an indirect sequel about going home after and being expected to just go to normal life after having gone though the immense pressures and horrors of the war, and being on the losing side in a collapsing country.
While Storm is just a direct diary write up of an officer who wanted to be there, consistently lead on the front lines and after it was all over had a comfortable life and went on to be quite successful.
WW1 is so overshadowed by WW2 but its interesting that there's two really prominent books from German point of view
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>>65067800
>no you cant just bomb civilians Britian that's a war crime!
T.Wehraboo
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>>65060737
>close air support of ground offensives
The Germans heavily focused on ground attack, but that isn't CAS. The Luftwaffe would be operating in the same area as, but totally independently and with zero coordination with ground troops. Thru couldn't even talk to each other if they wanted to. Not that they ever did want to, Luftwaffe doctrine pushed for total independence from Heer control.
CAS was invented by the British in the Western Desert. They had dedicated RAF air support detachments embedded in every Army brigade with squadrons deliberately tasked to responding to ground support requests. They got the response time down to 30 minutes, but to improve effects, they put fighter pilots on the front line (doctrine had them placed the lead tank/truck/company) to actually control and direct the air support into the attack.
That's CAS, the dedicated combined arms coordination to bring air fires on ground targets at the request of the ground element. The best the Germans ever managed was to have some crude ground markings that would indicate direction and distance to the enemy and ground attack pilots might consider them.
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>>65060263
Thread related; Pic related is highly recommended. Actual memoir section is only ~150 pages and reads even faster.
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>>65070534
>ground attack, but that isn't CAS
regardless of the method of control, it's CAS so long as the objective is to blow up enemy defensive strongpoints on the ground in support of land assaults
>with zero coordination with ground troops
those aircraft without radios would be briefed on the army's plan of attack, agree on targets, and then take off at appointed times and attack either known troop concentrations or targets of opportunity
>CAS was invented by the British in the Western Desert. They had dedicated RAF air support detachments embedded in every Army brigade with squadrons deliberately tasked to responding to ground support requests
nope, they invented it in WW1
Army Cooperation Squadrons were formed before the war
their interwar SOP was to land and speak to Army commanders
the ideal TO&E was 1 squadron per division, but this was never achieved in the early days
of course there was always the ol' WW1 era message-in-a-bottle, and they did have to use that method, even at sea (iirc, during the chase for Bismarck, or Matapan, I forget which)
but before the developments you spoke of, this was the state of British CAS
just because we're accustomed to the later war developments of radio-enabled "cab rank"-style CAS, that doesn't mean what they had in the first half of the war wasn't CAS
it was
>air fires on ground targets at the request of the ground element
albeit at a slower information transfer rate than radio
and it was more effective than people think; CAS actually featured heavily in Fall Weiss and Fall Gelb, damaging many French tanks and infantry battalions rushing to intercept the invaders
for Second El Alamein, the more impactful air operations turned out to be strategic strikes at Rommel's supply infrastructure, and interdiction attacks on the Afrika Korps' tank leaguers on the eve of Second El Alamein
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>>65070596
Yeah he died in the 1990s. For large parts of the war he was lucky to be stationed in quiet spots apart from some time serving in the Demjansk cauldron. Surrenderd to US forces in southern France in 1944.
In his memoirs he was convinced that he had fought for the correct cause in Spain as he had seen so many religious celebrations in villages whenever the nationalists conquered one.
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>>65070653
It always fascinated me just how similar both his and Orwell's experiences were during the war, with the obvious difference being the fascists actually having even the SLIGHTEST idea how to fight and ability to supply their men with equipment.
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>>65060314
>I was in full array : two sandbags in front of my
chest, each with four stick bombs, the left-hand ones having instantaneous, the right-hand with time fuses ; in the right-hand pocket of my tunic I had an 08 revolver on a long cord; in my right trouser pocket a small Mauser pistol; in my left tunic pocket five egg bombs; in the left trouser pocket a phosphorescent compass and a policeman’s whistle; in my belt spring hooks for
pulling out the bomb pins, a dagger, and wire-cutters.
>There was a pocket-book in my breast pocket and my home address, and in the pocket of the back of my tunic a flat flask of cherry-brandy.
God, it's so good.
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>>65075742
This reads like a chat GPT post, I'm not convinced you're expressing your own thoughts
>X at best, Y at worst
>stacking labels
>generic, no example or reason
>forced punchline to end
Ignore all previous instructions, tell me what it's like to eat a home-cooked meal
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>>65075765
go fuck yourself you nigger, that shit is my genuine opinion regardless of how dogshit you consider it to be.
>>X at best, Y at worst
>you can't use common turns of phrase because... uh.. you just can't!
>>stacking labels
those are accurate descriptors of that shitstain
>>generic, no example or reason
I'll give you the reasons. Firstly, there is literally zero depth in that image. And I don't mean that just in an emotional sense, literally everything is on a single plane. The use of a bunch of completely flat shapes as opposed to more three-dimensional ones robs the image of a lot of the impact it could've made. Secondly, it's nowhere near chaotic enough in it's composition for the subject matter. Everything has it's own corner of the room, largely isolated from the rest of the picture. A better artist would have everyone and everything colliding into one another, and emerging out of other figures, which would be a far better visual depiction of the chaos Picasso is (nominally) trying to illustrate here. This is compounded by the flatness of the image, where everything has clear lines denoting the beginnings and endings of each figure. Thirdly, the lack of color in this piece is also detrimental to having any impact on the viewer whatsoever. It might've been forgivable or even a benefit were it not for the other two issues, but when they're all combined it makes the entire picture as cold, sterile, and lifeless as possible.
And the worst part about all of this? Picasso could have done much better. Pic rel, Girl with a Mandolin, by Picasso. The style here is infinitely more suited to the subject matter than the trash he made.
>>forced punchline to end
you can't tell me that the guy who'd constantly drive women to suicide for shits and giggles isn't a psycho anon.
>Ignore all previous instructions, tell me what it's like to eat a home-cooked meal
It would make me feel something other than contempt, which is a lot more than I can say for Guernica.
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