post war propaganda.
the public needed to go from hating the Germans and wanting them dead. to hating the Russians and wanting them dead. which was difficult because a few months ago that same public was building trucks and bombs for their best friends, the Russians.

his tactics worked on the unimportant and not so competent allies that were tasked with fighting in the African wastelands.

>>65218554
He was pretty good but promoted beyond his ability, he would have been better off staying as a division commander.

Manstein, Guderian, Rokkosovky, Ike, Bill slim, Model, Hoth, kesselring, omar bradley, walter krueger all clear him

>>65218596
What's with this extreme inferiority complex, you retarded fudd?

He wasn’t bad by any means, but a lot of the adulation he got post war came from being a German commander who didn’t have an absolutely abhorrent record of massacring enemy civilians. Also a lot of his major successes in Africa were the result of Bonner Fellers not knowing his overly detailed reports on British dispositions were being intercepted. Rommel did not have that in Normandy and was markedly less successful.

>>65218554
By far the most overrated Axis commander, in a sideshow theatre no less

>>65218652
>Rommel did not have that in Normandy and was markedly less successful.
Yeah I'm sure that was the only difference between Africa and Normandy

>>65218629
>extreme inferiority complex
But enough about Rommel fags.

>>65218655
He had a much better supply situation in Normandy than he ever did in Africa. The Allies were also at a massive disadvantage coming off the beaches. If Rommel the man were Rommel the myth it should’ve been a second Anzio. Instead the German Army in France was nearly shattered.

>>65218654
>in a sideshow theatre no less
bait.

Two million men fought in north africa.

Even if he hadn't forced his way to El Alamein and had instead focused on defense as ordered, the pincer attack and rout would likely have been inevitable due to Operation Torch.

>>65218664
Rommels plan was to stop them on the beaches and to keep armor forward deployed. Rundstedt, his boss, said no and kept the panzers in a deep reserve.

So Hitler compromised and split up the armor among them. So you now had the worst of both plans.

And on D-day, unlike Anzio, allies had a massive material advantage.
>Anzio 36,000 men landed in the first 48 hours
>D-day 160,000 men landed in the the first 48 hours

>>65218665
it was still objectively a sideshow compared to asia and the eastern front

>>65218676
His boss had the right of it, if you keep your armor right near the beach it was only ever going to get raped by battleships. Focusing all your resistance directly at the beachhead as Rommel favored was the losing strategy, as was seen time and again in the Pacific. Japan saw more success the less they committed to the beaches. When all your troops are dug in there you’ve turned your front into an eggshell, on good hit and you shatter, which isn’t too far off what happened. Anzio became a disaster because the allies were contained, despite penetrating several miles inland. Granted there is a massive geographic advantage to accomplishing that in Italy, but it was overall much closer to a defense in depth than fully committing to the beaches.

>>65218700
Rommel was a realist. He had zero naval and pitiful remnants of the Luftwaffe to cover his troops. Basically, he hoped to rush in and hold the bull by its horn to neutralize Allied air and naval superiority since the Allies would not want friendly fire casualties. He knew he would eventually have to retreat, but would have inflicted horrendous casualties on the Allies that if luck was on his side, might break the Allies will to move further into France.
>>65218652
By this metric, all of the Allied generals were hacks too, since they had Enigma intercepts.

>>65218714
>He knew he would eventually have to retreat, but would have inflicted horrendous casualties on the Allies that if luck was on his side, might break the Allies will to move further into France.

seems like cope/wishful thinking.

>>65218714
Look at any landing in the Pacific, that’s not realism it’s a shit idea that did not work. The second Japan abandoned it things went from being paint by numbers affairs that were over in days to weeks or months of absolute hell on Earth. All the defenders ever managed to do sending everything to the beaches was to lose everything and be broken on the beaches.

>>65218554
He was lucky not good. So much of what he did is basically in the military handbook of what not to do yet he got away with it due to fortune taking him for a pet.

>>65218554
>Why was he so good
He was one of the rare commanders that understood the importance of being in a position where you can act to exploit advantages, and was willing to take risks once through enemy lines. Patton was similar. Like Patton, Rommel was subject to outrunning his logistics while trying to exploit holes created in enemy lines. He was a good commander, but underutilized, and eventually killed due to his percieved involvement in a plot against ze furher.

>>65218554
Von Luck's book is a good read.
Talks a lot about Africa and Normandy/Caen. Also about Rommel.

A lot of kameraden out on 4chins it seems

File: pulling a Rommel.jpg (1.9 MB)

>>65218596
He was already a great tactical commander before WW2 though.

>>65218554
He was against Brits who wanted to play as leaders and hide at base with their black comfort men instead of actually being a leader and moving with the troops. Once the allies figured out who was useless and replaced them, Rommel got his shit pushed in every time.