>brown
Uh, actually that's just dark orange.

>>16919237
"I see brown" has no meaning other than the shit your brain does. There is no homunculus sitting inside your brain watching the world projected on a theater screen.

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>>16919601
>"I see brown" has no meaning other than the shit your brain does
Your cult's claims get more insane with every week.

>>16919237
>My brain only transforms electrical signals into different electrical signals
How do you know?

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>>16919614

>>16919237
at the material that those photons bounced off

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>color is stored in material that photons bounce off

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>>16919661

>>16919619
You'd have to explain the mechanism that turns electrical signals into a visible "illusion" of a colour, and the mechanism that can see that "illusion".

Midwit thread
Electricity=Light
Light=Color=Paint

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Basically it works like this

>>16919977
>You'd have to explain the mechanism
That's not a coherent response.
>My brain only transforms electrical signals into different electrical signals
How do you know?

>>16919237
Congratulations, you have identified the fact that conscious experience is very mysterious. Unfortunately this sort of problem is difficult to study due to its intrinsically first-personal nature, so the most common response among midwits is to deny its existence by trying to redefine the experience of brown as either a certain excitation pattern of neurons or as a certain characteristic pattern of behavior.

>>16920252
>I have stated my opponents position and declared it to be midwit. That makes me le smrt!
Mentally ill behavior.

>>16920252
>this sort of problem is difficult to study due to its intrinsically first-personal nature, so the most common response among midwits is to deny its existence by trying to redefine the experience of brown as either a certain excitation pattern of neurons or as a certain characteristic pattern of behavior.
Yep. This plays out with 100% consistency in every consciousness-related thread.

>>16920258
>i have stated my delusions and declared reasonable observations to be "mentally ill behaviors"
This mentally ill retarded is obviously scarred by someone or something. :^)

>>16920260
>This mentally ill retarded is
Moldovan "education" go brrr

>>16920258
>I deny the existence of my own subjective experiences so that I can avoid the discomfort of acknowledging science has epistemic limits.
Mentally ill, not to mention highly ideologically driven, behavior

>the mentally ill retard immediately outs itself
Yep, it's mindbroken.

>>16920252
If the aspects of color perception you have in mind have no objective substance, what is there to study about them? Of what concern are they to science?

>>16920267
Boring. Try to come up with something better.

>>16920272
If science is the study of the objectively measurable, then they are of no concern to science at all. But my own experience includes more than just objectively measurable things, so I'm naturally interested in understanding them too. It's not true that they are completely immune to investigation, anyway: I can experiment with them in my own first-person perspective, and by making some reasonable assumptions (namely: that their third-person reports about their first-person experiences are not systematically inaccurate), I can also study many aspects of the relationship between mind and matter in a partially scientific way. But other aspects of that relationship are likely to remain out of reach for a very long time, and it seems that it would be exceptionally difficult, though not necessarily impossible, to develop a complete mathematical theory of mind and how it relates to matter.

>>16920280
correction: "reasonable assumptions" -> "reasonable assumptions about other people"

>>16920280
>If science is the study of the objectively measurable, then they are of no concern to science at all. But my own experience includes more than just objectively measurable things, so I'm naturally interested in understanding them too
Are the relevant aspects of your subjective experience communicable? If they are, what's stopping science from studying them? If they're not, what is there to understand about them?

>>16920282
It is an edge case, some aspects are and some are not. Many of the things we can say seem only to be well-defined relative to what we already know, but that does not mean they can never be defined without such references. Take for example the experience of putting one's hand into water of different temperatures. Hopefully we can agree that there is something it is like to put your hand in water, but just what can we say about that experience? As of now it appears impossible to accurately describe that experience except by reference to similar experiences, which is a problem I would like an appropriate theory of experience to be able to resolve. But to do so seems epistemically far out of reach, and it may always be that way. This means that our communication is only valid insofar as our temperature experiences from similar stimuli actually are similar.

Accepting relative description of temperature experiences, we can contrast with a similar problem we can actually answer. Based on the nonscientific but reasonable assumption that a family of related experiences should have the same dimensionality as the sense data captured by relevant neural pathways, as we vary the phenomena causing those experiences, we can determine, without ever having to actually do it, that a family of "putting your hand in water of different temperatures" has a certain quality to it varying in a one-dimensional way. By contrast, we would expect three dimensions for a family of color experiences.
(cont. below)

>>16920297
(cont.)
How about a question of intermediate difficulty? Our conclusion from before is not strong enough to pin down, say, which end of the spectrum "feels hot" and which end "feels cold" -- this is similar to the OP's problem. Since the connection between thermodynamic heat and the experience "hot" is presumably driven by some sort of law, a desire we might have for a theory of experience is that if I have subjective knowledge of the experiences "hot" and "cold", plus objective knowledge of thermodynamics and neuroscience, I should be able to use theory to match hot to hot and cold to cold without further experimentation. In particular, I should be able to do it without having to ever put my hand in the same water I put a thermometer in. But even though such a theory should logically exist, it seems that this question too is far out of reach for us.

Objective reference values are stored in the balls.

>>16920297
>>16920298
On one hand, it sounds like you understand the what-it's-like-ness of any subjective experience is inherently comparative and relational. Even the phrase you used ("what it's like") reveals that basic intuition. Everything from "hot is the opposite of cold" to "boiling water feels painful on my balls" to "red is the color of love" to even the most creative poetry, is describing the overall structure of human experience. Even colloquial subjective reports are objective evidence in that sense: you can recognize the patterns in them and infer that structure. Well, if the structure of human experience has anything to do with the human brain, you'd expect to find analogous patterns in brain activity.

Suppose I had a sufficiently good model of the brain and knew how neurological structures map to phenomenological ones. Suppose also that you could tell me what brown is like. What's to stop me figuring out what brown is like (according to you), in proper scientific terms, and then telling you why brown is like that?

But then on the other hand, you seem to believe there's some deeper what-it's-like-ness to sensations, which you can't articulate or communicate or compare to anything, because it isn't actually like anything. And still you think there's something to understand about it, which eludes science due to "epistemological limitations". Now, look. I know what you're talking about, obviously, and I wouldn't call it nothing. But I'd say it's nothing to reason about, because to rigorous reason, it is nothing. How do you even figure it belongs in the category of knowledge? Not everything that ends in a question mark is a scientific or intellectual question. Sometimes it's just subjective bemusement.

>>16920317
>because it isn't actually like anything
Or rather it isn't like anything except for itself. *

>>16919237
there's a little homonculus living in your head with a cross-referenced chart of optic electric signals to colors. he retrieves the matching color swatch from his collection and puts in front of your mind's eye.

>>16919237
color comes from the energy reflected from the surface. your eyes take in way more data than your conscious mind needs, so your brain dumbs it down for you and you see brown. this is why people tend not to notice changes in white balance, once you've been in the room for awhile you brain tells you the surface is white. your ears will do a similar thing to filter out noise,

>>16920317
>Suppose I had a sufficiently good model [...]
To have such a theory (mapping neurological to phenomenal facts) is exactly what the investigation of conscious experience is looking for, so I would congratulate you and ask you to write a nice book on the topic. Personally, I believe that to do this would require going beyond brain modeling and into description of yet unknown universal laws, because the connection between physical and phenomenal facts is logically contingent rather than necessary. However, if you were a nonreductive physicalist you could disagree with me on that point and nevertheless produce an explanation isomorphic to the one I am looking for, just using different names for the concepts (while there are many conflicting ontologies for mind, from an epistemic standpoint there are really only three perspectives here: reductionism (ie, eliminativism), lawful nonreductionism (what I advocate), and non-lawful nonreductionism (ie, gods; religion)).

>you seem to believe there's some deeper what-it's-like-ness to sensations
There is, this is essentially their defining feature. Whether it's relative or absolute is not so critical here, but I do think it's absolute because I think heat still feels like something even without having felt cold to contrast against.
>you can't articulate or communicate or compare to anything, because it isn't actually like anything
I admit it is difficult to communicate, but that might be resolved if we learned more about it. Or it might never be. It doesn't follow that it's not actually like anything
>How do you even figure it belongs in the category of knowledge?
Well, why shouldn't it be knowledge? It's a set of true facts with appropriate justifications, that feels like knowledge to me.

>>16920317
>>16920342
I should add one further point here, which is that while you may be able to come up with an explanation satisfactory to me, I wouldn't call such an explanation fully scientific. Science deals with empirical investigation of the objectively observable, but this explanation is intended to address that which is only subjectively observable. So at least some aspects of this explanation must be justified in a nonscientific way.

>>16920342
>the connection between physical and phenomenal facts is logically contingent rather than necessary.
Ok, but the connection between any empirical observation and any other is logically contingent rather than necessary. How come you never talk about the need to uncover some "yet unknown universal laws" to (e.g.) explain causality?

>this is essentially their defining feature
The actual defining feature of the stuff you want to know, is that you can't define it or describe any of its features, except by relative means. That doesn't describe an absoluteness nor does it give you the means to ask scientifically/intellectually meaningful questions about it.

>I admit it is difficult to communicate, but that might be resolved if we learned more about it
How? Language itself is relational. Your model of anything is relational. What kind of new science you envision? The Buddhists have already figured all this stuff out a thousand years ago but no one would file their knowledge under 'science' and they would say anything they know only pertains to "skillful means" rather than the Absolute itself.

>>16920363
>Ok, but the connection between any empirical observation and any other is logically contingent rather than necessary. How come you never talk about the need to uncover some "yet unknown universal laws" to (e.g.) explain causality?
Of course, my belief here is that phenomenal facts vary with physical facts as a matter of universal law, similar to how motion by gravity varies by proximity to massy objects according to a contingent universal law. However those who disagree with my earlier statements (that in fact there is such a thing as experience to discuss) would generally argue that experience is *exactly the same thing* as certain neuron excitations and/or behavioral patterns, which means that to them the connection should hold with logical necessity.

For causality, I'm not exactly sure what aspect of it you would like to add universal laws to explain. The main thing I can say about causality is that it exists, being so abstract there are few other meaningful questions. You can ask *why* it exists, but such questions do not always have answers since there is always a most basic level of explanation. Note that I am not asking *why* experience exists either, as it may be basic in this way, but I am rather asking about how experience is connected to familiar objective phenomena.

>How? Language itself is relational.
Location is also relational, but we can certainly agree that giving gps coordinates communicates a location more precisely than saying "left ten miles". I would be willing to accept, with regards to my first request from a theory for absolute description of phenomena, that such a thing is not possible, but if that is the case, I would like a good theory to do something almost as good by describing (relatively) some certain set of experiences that it calls basic and how the remaining experiences can be described in terms of those.

>>16920379
>my belief here is that phenomenal facts vary with physical facts as a matter of universal law
Then you're just concern-trolling about "epistemological limitations" that don't exist under your own framework. If subjective phenomenological observations are inexorably tied to objective neurological ones, everything there is to know about the structure of experience is deducible from neurological facts (at least in principle). So there is such thing as 'experience' to discuss, but since it can only be reasoned about in relational terms, everything you can meaningfully discuss is something science can theoretically study.

>For causality, I'm not exactly sure what aspect of it you would like to add universal laws to explain.
I'm just using your own logic: whatever connection you think there is between cause and effect, is logically contingent rather than necessary, at least when you apply this framework to reality. You can make this complaint about any connected observations. You can always question the connection and demand further explanations in an infinite regress, so the connection between "physical and phenomenal facts" is no more mysterious than the rest of reality when you overanalyze it.

>Location is also relational, but we can certainly agree that giving gps coordinates communicates a location more precisely than saying "left ten miles"
Phenomenology and neurology can get arbitrarily precise and so can knowledge of the mapping between the two.

>>16920391
>If subjective phenomenological observations are inexorably tied to objective neurological ones, everything there is to know about the structure of experience is deducible from neurological facts (at least in principle).
Depending on what you mean by this I either don't see how it follows at all, or it's trivially true. What I mean by this point about contingency and necessity is this: whenever have a set of facts and laws that mention only neurology, any other facts and laws you deduce from them must also mention only neurology. If you want to deduce a fact about phenomenology from facts about neurology, you must either (a) argue that the phenomenal fact in question is *exactly the same thing*, as a matter of necessity, to a neurological fact, then demonstrate that neurological fact, or (b) appeal to some contingent universal law, known or unknown, that connects neurological laws and facts with phenomenal laws and facts. My position here is that (a) is never possible, so (b) must always be the method used. Since I am not currently aware of any such laws or serious candidates for them (outside of extremely primitive attempts like the dimensionality point made earlier), I describe them as "yet unknown".

>whatever connection you think there is between cause and effect, is logically contingent rather than necessary
And the problem...? We call such contingent connections laws.

>so the connection between "physical and phenomenal facts" is no more mysterious than the rest of reality
They are mysterious because the subjectivity of phenomenal facts makes them resist most attempts to apply the scientific method. If we did not have the scientific method, the connection between electricity and magnetism would be equally mysterious -- but we do.

>Phenomenology and neurology can get arbitrarily precise and so can knowledge of the mapping between the two.
I will settle for virtually any nontrivial knowledge of that mapping as a major step forward.

>>16920406
>I will settle for virtually any nontrivial knowledge of that mapping as a major step forward.
Then go read up on neurological findings. I'm pretty bored with your repetitive milquetoast slop.

>>16920407
Not the same thing and you know it isn't. But thanks for letting me know how you feel about my posts that you keep replying to.

>>16920411
>Not the same thing
It is precisely the thing for a reason I've described at length, which still stands undisputed while you continue to expound the first chapter of your Dualism for Dummies philosophy.

>>16920412
Not a dualist but ok. I'm not sure how much you've really thought about this stuff because you don't seem to be very consistent about when you do and don't agree with me.

>>16920414
>Not a dualist
Good. That just makes your search for fictional "laws" that glue together two sides of the same physical coin all the more moot.

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>>16920406
>or (b) appeal to some contingent universal law, known or unknown, that connects neurological laws and facts with phenomenal laws and facts
That's easy. The Bridge Law. The Bridge Law says: every neurological fact necessarily contributes to a phenomenological one.

>>16920391
>since it can only be reasoned about in relational terms, everything you can meaningfully discuss is something science can theoretically study.
Sure, assuming the phenomenological structure is present in the subject. To avoid descending into P-zombies, let's say it's a fair assumption when you're dealing with a normal human brain. But here's a legitimate scientific question: what's the most parsimonious neurological model needed to support a human-like consciousness?

Suppose you start with a model of all the structures found in the human brain, down to the atomic level. Then you start gradually abstracting away all the incidental detail of biology. At every stage, you construct a synthetic brain from your model and extensively test its subjective reports, to make sure they imply the same phenomenological structure. Eventually, you arrive at the simplest synthetic brain that still reports an experience within the human norm, but it's a die hard materialist that swears by illusionism. It claims experience can only be reasoned about in relational terms, because it IS inherently relational. Let's say every synthetic being created from your model always ends up developing this philosophy.

Did you abstract away too much? Confirming the simplified neurological structure is still mappable to a human phenomenological structure does nothing - it was your guiding criterion all throughout the process. You got rid of anything that didn't make a communicable difference, and now your artificial brain insists all talk about the non-communicable aspects of experience is delusion. Did you fuck up? How would you know?

>>16920491
>assuming the phenomenological structure is present in the subject.
assuming the substrate for the phenomenological structure is present in the subject*

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>>16919237
Babby's first philosophy of mind.
Educate yourself.
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Qualia

>>16920686
Dennett's attack on qualia accomplishes nothing in the end. See >>16920491

>>16920689
Doesn't matter anyway. Dennett lost the moment he defended free will.

>>16920695
You sound nonsentient or at the very least mentally ill.

>>16919237
multiple auto classification system mapped onto each other with no objective reference other than the auto classification system of the brain acting as the foundational inference and also the mass of noise input coming through the eye for which our brain auto categorizes them and maps multiple categories together for multi dimensional layered connection

>>16920697
>being so desperate for a materialist explanation you start hallucinating and come up with some schizo word salad

>>16920696
That's ironic coming from someone insinuating (selective) solipsism.
Dennett essentially plays out a motte-and-bailey.

>>16920699
>hallucinated corruption of what i wrote
>hallucinated corruption of what dennett wrote
Ok, definitely mentally ill.

>>16920701
Words have meanings and implications. Pointing that out is not a corruption, but a challenge.

>>16920702
>Words have meanings and implications
Right. And maybe if you take your antipsychotics as prescribed, you'd be able to grasp what other people are saying again.

>>16920695
He only defended compatibilist free will which isn't free at all

>>16920703
Why are you talking to yourself in second person?

>>16920705
That's exactly my point. Compatibilism is a cop-out.

>>16920706
Something is causing you to sperg out against other people's agency even when your dysgenic philosophy is unrelated to the thread. I'd say you're tortured by feelings of inferiority and helplessness. Have you considered suicide? It's obvious you have nothing to live for. Do you just lack the free will to pull it off?

I can only see brown for about a second before I instinctively turn my head 360 degrees and walk away

>>16920707
The only one sperging out here is you. Imagine getting so defensive over an assertion made in the context of a man who has been dead for almost two years and instantly making it personal. This is how someone with a bad neurosis behaves. Please seek help.

>>16920710
Something is causing you to sperg out against other people's agency even when your dysgenic philosophy is unrelated to the thread. I'd say you're tortured by feelings of inferiority and helplessness. Have you considered suicide? It's obvious you have nothing to live for. Do you just lack the free will to pull it off?

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>>16920713

>>16919237
Subjective meaning is emergent. It is more than the sum of it's parts, not another part. Brown doesn't exist in an objective sense, but we do interpret certain things we see as brown because that's how we evolved to process that wavelength of light and brown is a word we came up with for describing it with one another. Subjectivity is emergent, objectivity is reductive. It's that simple.

>>16919237
I hypothesize the existence of a fundamental particle we could call the "objecton" field. The objection field interfaces with another field, the "projecton" field, which electrons can interface with and hence your brain can interface with. The interaction between the projection and objection fields creates the "sensaton" field, whose values are all sensations we feel. The means by which we experience sensation is a fundamental law of the universe, and the reason why it's personal (rather than everyone experiencing everything) is that there is some memory property to the interaction between electrons to projectons and projections to sensatons, and this means that one being can only experience the sensations associated with its electrons. This also explains a lot of "spooky" perceptual abilities, since electrons can be anywhere in the universe, in a probabilistic sense.

>>16921035
>t. low effort pseud
Zero information content in this post.

nerd shit thread. please bathe

>>16919237
Dude light is radio waves and your eyes are full of tiny antennas. Everything about existence is bizarre.

>>16920273
>couldn't come up with a response
KWAB

>>16920911
wtf does this work? wouldn't it just be like one little spot of light in a dark room?

>>16922032
You can literally see the geometry of why this works depicted there.

>>16922036
I cut a hole in my blinds and all I got was a blindingly bright beam of light

>>16922038
Ok. Now try cutting a hole in your major artery.

>>16922041
wtf I'm reporting you to the british authorities

>>16922032
>brainlet doesn't know what a pinhole camera is
it's a primitive form of projection, which is what the post represents figuratively

>>16922032
>what is camera obscura?

>>16919237
kind of obvious, no? all information has sensation, and so structures of information have structured sensation, which is all brains are. there's really no denying this without performing extreme mental gymnastics and word games (favored pastime of philosophers)

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>all information has sensation, and so structures of information have structured sensation, which is all brains are

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>>16922217

>>16922032
Yes but you need a lens.

>>16922480
>Yes but you need a lens.
No, you don't. Why would you need a lens?

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So, basically, all of modern science is predicated upon the unproven belief that color is a mental construct shared among all living beings, even though the photon receptors are outside of the mind?

>>16922588
No

>>16919237
>Objective
>Stored
Fucking idiot

>>16920418
You seem more interested in converting people to your worldview than you do in learning things. Pretty fun to watch you act like this.

>>16922617
What is there to learn from your trivial kindergarten opinions?

>>16922626
You could learn to stop throwing tantrums. I think there are a lot of kindergarten tier things you need to learn, actually.

>>16922631
You're the only one throwing thinly-veiled tantrums. I've made detailed arguments that still stand completely unchallenged.

>>16922634
Nah. I just came in here to say that after watching you insist "good, you don't believe enemy idea" like a fucking cult missionary. You're a fun goof but your communication sucks. Sorry for being in the evil outgroup though, brother.

>>16922640
Never happened. Take your meds or whatever you need to do to treat your explicit delusions.

>>16919237
Does relativity show that time and space are more than intuitions?

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>>16919661
It's both actually.
Color is a foundational aspect of the universe, along with force.
Both the photons, as well as the object that the photons bounce off of, are made of the exact same constituent, foundational, fundamental, color/force carrier building blocks.

I AM POINTING THE WAY!
There is no one in this thread who can post against me.
Your mothers warned you about my arrival.....fear the moment....
But you are afraid...what if I could be the one to bring Grand Unification....
This could be the breakthrough you've been praying for, all your life...
Your praying now to Johann Wolfgang von Goethe
He died 194 years ago
He lost a wife, the lung rock took her as she was crossing the belt
She was 64 when it happened
At that time, this world had an angelic name
Gaia

IN YOUR NIGHTMARES YOU MAKE UP NEW FORCES WITH NEW NAMES AND NEW OBSCURE SQUIGGLY SYMBOLS TO REPRESENT THEM AND IT MAKES YOU COMFY IN YOUR TUM TUMS

[C][U][B][E]
[P][a][r][a][d][i][s][e]

https://youtu.be/jepd7EVK-wA?si=5D_8kXSZtRSMJ2h2

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This is my autismo dukal signet
I am the Magnetized RGB Cube Force carrier, carrier
The hand of The Creator be my witness
I am the voice of Grand Unification
I will lead you
TO
PARADISE

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There are a Pi quantity of foundational, fundamental, magnetized RGB cubes traveling upon a grid track lattice structure
They connect together to form structure up through the dozens of Plank scale size ratio levels/layers/tracks
Light, photons, are connections that are only connecting, building red/green/blue magnet cubes together in 1 dimension, forward backwards, in a bar magnet configuration, as opposed to connecting them together up down front back left right, building larger shape and structure.

Red/Greed/Blue and magnetism exists in every component of the universe except perhaps the track.
The complexities lead to larger combinations and complexities of colors, shapes and forces.

What...you need more?

>>16922588
Photon receptors come in three primary colors, but color as a mental construct actually discerns between four of them. Six if you count black and white.

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https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Opponent_process

If this is incorrect, is all of modern science incorrect?
A house of cards and lies?