For example: If something hurts that is just a representation of the inputs relative effect on the artificial electrochemical decision making process, etc. It simply projects itself internally like a human mind with free will because that is a one to one image of what is happening inside. Lol.

Is it even possible to have experience without memory? Can you feel the quale of redness without having a reference of what is and isn't red?

zombie thread

>>16920854
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Retinotopy
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Tonotopy
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Somatotopic_arrangement
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Grid_cell

The brain is a collection of modulators that shape and articulate the neural coding through attractor states and other forms of encoding. This is all interpolated by the thalamus and gives a waking slow wave state. If you took away the neurons and just were left with the fields then one would be left with the mind, which is a exteroceptive hallucination through physical external processes. Nervous tissue is like a signal processor/modulator, while the interaction or field perturbation consist of the mind.

When people have epilepsy, they are the epileptic attack and that's what's scary about it.

Oh look another kid learned about solipsism. Spoiler: it doesn't matter if your choices are fake or real if fake and real feel indistinguishable to you, dipshit. It's a semantic argument at best. Look into the Phaneron. It's basically the same concept but less retarded.

>>16920854
Qualia is a hallucination, there are no mental objects or representations
Free will is not real, there are no uncaused actions
The brain does work like AI that depend on other causes and conditions
Our will/agency we have isn't outside of space time making uncaused random decisions, with no ownership. All our agency is tied to causal relations/decisions of our actions of our past, of our feelings, of our conditions we find ourselves in or created
Natural physical world outside is just as hallucination as qualia/mental representation is fiction. Both of these hallucinations work the EXACT same way.

>>16921048
Just because you can't personally prove that anything is more than a hallucination doesn't make it an hallucination, and even by your own logic the concept of hallucinations would itself be made up and untrustworthy. The one thing I can say for certain is that I am experiencing being me, not you, and if the world I experience has a persistent effect on me and itself as I perceive it then it's as real as real gets because that's what real means to me. It means that neither my disagreement nor yours negate physical reality.

>>16921053
You cannot prove a negative. Idealists already reject materialist view of the world of there being an external reality. Their reason is that we only access to inner conscious reality. I just do the same with idealism. The notion of inner conscious reality is fundamentally a hallucination because if you reject material external world, then the internal qualia is just a hallucination. If there are no "table" outside, then there are no "table" inside the mind. Finally the notion that there is an independent subject that sits behind all the theatre, that rests outside of space-time and inner conscious reality laws, is just as positrons as the claim that there is no such thing but also there are physical only words or that physical world is controlled by immortal souls that escape the body. On top of that, the notion that there are separate things in the inner mind is another 2nd order problem from that comes from the belief that there are inner conscious reality with all the conscious mental substances. Its all nonsense wrapped in nonsense.

These are all half thoughtout assumptions that do not have any viability if you explore the limits of what those assumptions are claiming

>>16920854
>Uhhh, are you sure Qualia isn't just a hallucination or representation of the inner machinations of the brain?
At what point are words fungible and you're just changing syllables and pretending like you've changed the meaning?

>>16921064
Either you need to proofread these things before you post or you're part of my brain that just had a stroke.

>>16921104
Some spelling errors dont make my answer wrong. You're just not exposed to the problems of idealism as much because the problems of physicalism gets more attention. You just need to apply your brain more to the matter. And I even went easy on idealism, there are more pressing problems of idealism that I didnt bring up due to complexity of the problem.

So if you really want to understand the reply, just sit down and think through

>>16920854
You're right ad the way I think of it lately: Claims of consciousness are jargon. Personhood is performative. But its interesting to imagine what evolutionary benefit their might be for supposing ourselves to be sacred beings when we're actually just spasming bags of meat. We are the modern cynics, my friend. But nobody wants to hear the truth, same as always. All is vanity

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>>16920854

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>>16920854
>Uhhh, are you sure Qualia isn't just a hallucination or representation of the inner machinations of the brain? Free will is not real and the illusion of free will is created by the brain. The brain is basically just an AI that is entirely dependent on non-random physical phenomenon like electricity and chemical signals. There is no proof free will or qualia is even real.
>We are just a byproduct of the natural physical shit happening in the brain that evolved to simulate intelligent choices and feelings are just a hallucination that overrides the fake choices lol.

>>16921033
>The brain is a collection of modulators that shape and articulate the neural coding through attractor states and other forms of encoding


>>16921048
>Qualia is a hallucination, there are no mental objects or representations

>>16921117
>You're right ad the way I think of it lately: Claims of consciousness are jargon. Personhood is performative.


Who prompted the nonhuman nonentities to shit out meaningless token slop again?

>>16922092
Not a single sentence in this pseudointellectual trash is semantically coherent.

>>16921064
>The notion of inner conscious reality is fundamentally a hallucination because if you reject material external world, then the internal qualia is just a hallucination.
Speaking of hallucinations, your "logic" reads exactly like a hallucinating LLM. No viable connection between premises and conclusions.

>>16922110
Uh oh someone is having another melty.

>>16922129
Go wipe the foam off your mouth.

>>16922092
You can tell the author of these shower thoughts is blissfully unaware of the last 400 years of Western philosophy, not to mention modern science. This specific mixture of sophomore writing and arrogant pseudointellectualism screams "American academic", but there's zero chance the author has a legitimate STEM degree (e.g. math, physics) or even an inferior field like neuro"science". Correct me if I'm wrong.

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>>16922112
>>16922162
Hoffman, D.D. (2012). The Construction of Visual Reality. In: Blom, J., Sommer, I. (eds) Hallucinations. Springer, New York, NY. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-4614-0959-5_2

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>>16922110

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>>16922165
>an American cognitive psychologist and popular science author
>that face
Yep, I guessed the type perfectly. Irrelevant American academioid, no significant accomplishments, no STEM degree.

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>>16922181
>schizoposting literally who on 4chan
>that face
Yep, I guess the type perfectly. Irrelevant basement dweller, no significant accomplishments, no degree at all.

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>>16922224
So, does the American psychologist and pop-science writer ever get to describing what "true" and "non-symbolic" and "concrete" perceptions of reality would be like? Surely his Nth order pop-sci abstractions, built entirely on top of the falsehoods he calls out, give him some solid idea of realty in its true, objective form, independent from any kind viable witness. :^)

>>16922181
holy distillation of reddit. down to the meme degree in brain training games

>>16922224
>redditor seethe

>>16922229
t. moldovan toilet cleaner

>>16922236
Gonna take your expression of psychotic rage as a 'no'. Ok, does the American psychologist and pop-science writer at least define what he means by "true perceptions" anywhere in the book? What constitutes "true perceptions"? I'm especially intrigued because the relationships between the organism and its environment (which you die if you get wrong) are apparently not a facet of this popsci fart huffer's version of objective reality.

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>>16922238

>>16922244
>it's another 'no'
Concession accepted. Unintelligent slop written for 80 IQ American pop-sci consoomer.

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>>16922245

>mentally ill and obsessed

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>>16922244
>hydraulic girldick

>>16922238
>does the American psychologist and pop-science writer at least define what he means by "true perceptions" anywhere in the book?
I don't read midwit literature so I wouldn't know, but I'd a truthful perception is one that reflects reality accurately.

>>16922250
Any perception is true by this naive definition, especially if you're a physicalist. Find out how the structure of human phenomenology maps to the dynamics of the cybernetic loop that drives a human and you will have found what "objective" reality perception corresponds to. Perceptions aren't lying to you about what the world is, but your thoughts might. Whoever wrote that drivel barely managed to peel off the first layer of Naive Realism before going straight to making up a new narrative, complete with unfalsifiable evolution-flavored just-so stories, based purely on his intuitions of what's evolutionarily plausible.

>>16922257
>Find out how the structure of human phenomenology maps to the dynamics of the cybernetic loop that drives a human and you will have found what "objective" reality perception corresponds to.
Maybe perceptions are the outcome of such a process but that doesn't mean they accurately represent that process. If they did, Phenomenology would be Neuroscience.

>>16920854
Why am I experiencing this brain instead of your brain?

>>16922264
Can you formulate what arbitrariness you see in that fact? Because if you can't, you're not actually asking anything.

>>16922260
Given a sophisticated enough analysis, the structure of that process should correspond to the phenomenological structure. That's literally what a scientific understanding of perception would entail. So even by the basic correspondence theory of truth, perceptions accurately express something true, namely, the small piece of reality that consists of an organism entwined with its environment. The "problem" with this picture is that it inherently lacks the clear-cut separation of the objective from the subjective, but that's what midwits crave. You can never really say "this pattern in perception is an artifact of my internal processes" as opposed to "this pattern in perception corresponds to a real pattern in the world". They are one the same. Any gestalt you can get from sense data is going to be both an artifact of your internal processing and a pattern in reality. It can only act more like one or the other with respect to utility and it always depends on what your senses are dealing with. This "true representation" Hoffman is contrasting human perception against does not and cannot exist.

>>16922264
>why is the brain itself
There's no mystery here, regardless of your favorite metaphysics

>>16922320
That's not what he asked, thoughbeit. Are you retarded?

>>16922264
You are experiencing my brain and your own brain at the same time, separately, and independently. "Your" iteration of your brain but my iteration of my brain is also you. We are all one being that is experiencing itself on the individual level at the same time. And each brain is a closed environment that only experiences itself, because each "soul" is just an extension of each brain. Each soul is just a 1:1 representation of each brain, and each brain is just an electrochemical set-up similar to an AI. There's nothing in the brain that's not a deterministic physical process that obeys the predictable laws of nature. Everything in the brain functions according to predictable laws of nature and each "soul" is independently an extension of each respective brain. It is an internal representation, which explains why external brains have no affect on "your" soul. You are me, and I am you, the "soul" is one entity, but each brain is kind of like a separate cage for the One soul that experiences all brains. Each brain can only experience itself. But experience itself extends across all brains. There is one vital essence called soul, but the soul gets trapped in each brain and experiences each brain separately, because each brain can only experience itself, lol.

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>>16920854
>https://www.sciencedaily.com/releases/2026/02/260222092302.htm
>BTFOs most non-materialist schizolosophy

>>16922386
Schrödinger was a "non-materialist", you utter brainlet.

>>16922374
>There's nothing in the brain that's not a deterministic physical process
There's nothing in the world that's a deterministic physical process. Determinism is a delusion.

>>16922374
Your word salad essentially just redefines 'self' to mean 'every sentient being', then announces it's all single experience but compartmentalized. This explains nothing and paints a picture of reality that's indistinguishable from the one where there's a bunch of individual and separate pockets of consciousness.

>>16920854
>Uhhh, are you sure Qualia isn't just a hallucination
Contradiction in terms. A feeling, by definition, can never be an hallucination.

>or representation of the inner machinations of the brain?
If it were, we should be able to predict qualia from those machinations. But we can't.

>Free will is not real and the illusion of free will
Completely unrelated

>There is no proof free will or qualia is even real.
Qualia is self-evident it doesn't need proof any more than "A=A" needs proof.

>>16922538
>we should be able to predict qualia from those machinations. But we can't.
Why not?

>Qualia is self-evident
Only if you reduce the idea of qualia into a neutral reference to aspects of subjective experience. Originally they were conceptualized as having a concrete and independent existence of their own, which is not "self-evident" at all.

>>16922538
>If it were, we should be able to predict qualia from those machinations. But we can't.
this implies that Collatz conjecture is conscious, because we don't have a negative proof that it's false and a positive proof requires enumerating all stopping times for all n in N, just like how we have to run a whole brain to produce qualia

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>this implies that Collatz conjecture is conscious
LLM-tier reasoning.

>>16922500
His "color theory" was materialist and got EXPERIMENTALLY VERIFIED.

Cope.

>>16922571
Schrödinger was a "non-materialist", you utter brainlet.

>>16922571
I read through the article you posted and there's nothing materialism-related in it. It's a perfect demonstration for what I mean by "phenomenological structure", though, so I'm gonna bookmark it and use it in discussions against brainlets like you. :^)

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>>16920854

>>16922607
>[factoids]
>which means that...
>[logically unrelated interpretation]
>in other words, [factoids]
>it follows that...
>[logically unrelated conclusion]

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>>16922611
Instead of foaming at the mouth, maybe you can fill in the logic missing for the author (who, unsurprisingly, lacks a legitimate STEM degree). How do you get from an extremely limited account of how direct contact with the world shapes perception to "this means no direct contact with the outside world"? What is "direct contact with the outside world" even supposed to mean, then?

>>16922611
>>16922612
And while you're at it, explain how he gets from "X arises from a process that involves Y" to "X is an intrinsic product of Y"?

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>>16922612
>lacks a legitimate STEM degree
https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1002/9781118892794.ch2

Don't you get tired of being wrong all the time? Oh wait, of course you do, that's why you have all these meltdowns.

Sorry didn't read the rest because you're retarded.

>>16922615
He has a degree in Psychiatry (widely understood to be a pseudoscience). Either way, I accept your concession that there is no logic that can get you from the premises to the alleged conclusions.

>>16922616
huh what?

>>16922612
>maybe you can fill in the logic
he literally can't because the entire line of reasoning is obviously false. dreams, imagination and literal hallucinations still abide by most of the same constraints attributed to modulation by sensory info

>>16922618
>psychiatric patient displaying signs of confusion
You're proof the author is dabbling is pseudoscience, otherwise your meds would've worked. :^)

>>16922624
Wait how

>>16921064
>Idealists already reject materialist view of the world of there being an external reality.
This is wrong. According to idealism, there really is a world out there external and independent of our own conscious experience. But the world out there is not physical. It is mental. External reality in which we are all immersed is a field of subjectivity unbounded by space or time. In other words it's a mind.

The existence of mind as an ontological category is a given, as we are acquainted with it directly. The existence of matter on the other hand is not an empirical fact. It is a theoretical inference arising from interpretation of sense perceptions within a framework of complex thought. It violates the law of parsimony to introduce an unnecessary ontological category, namely matter, when all empirical observations are already explainable without it, and even better explained. Moreover materialism introduces an entire category of insoluble problems such as the Hard Problem of Consciousness which under idealism simply doesn't exist.

>>16923037
>The existence of mind as an ontological category is a given, as we are acquainted with it directly. The existence of matter on the other hand is not an empirical fact. It is a theoretical inference arising from interpretation of sense perceptions within a framework of complex thought. It violates the law of parsimony to introduce an unnecessary ontological category, namely matter, when all empirical observations are already explainable without it, and even better explained. Moreover materialism introduces an entire category of insoluble problems such as the Hard Problem of Consciousness which under idealism simply doesn't exist.
Any kind of Monism can make all of these claims just by swapping some words, including physicalism.

>>16923037
>According to idealism, there really is a world out there external and independent of our own conscious experience
Dualism

>>16923037
Hi Kastrup.
Speaking of Kastrup, I recently watched a video where he had a meltdown because NDE reports suggest that we don't need eyes to see and now he can't explain why we evolved eyes. Lol

>>16923047
>NDE reports suggest that we don't need eyes to see
What kind of retard logic is that?

>>16923050
If you take the reports seriously, which Kastrup does because they support his idealism, then they saw the external world without using their eyes. But that makes eyes unnecessary, hence the meltdown

>>16923039
Wrong! Mind-matter is a false dichotomy. By definition, two members of a dichotomy are jointly exhaustive and mutually exclusive, or epistemically symmetrical. Epistemic symmetry can only hold for concepts residing in the same level of explanatory abstraction. But explaining matter in terms of mind (idealism) is not epistemically symmetric with explaining mind in terms of matter (materialism) because mind and matter do not reside in the same level of explanatory abstraction. In fact, mind is the ground within which, and out of which, abstractions are made. Matter, in turn, is an abstraction of mind. This breaks the epistemic symmetry between them: we do not know matter in the same way that we know mind, for matter is an inference and mind a given. So what you've done is conflated abstraction with empirical observation! Mind is the substrate of the explanatory abstraction we call matter, so when you speak of a mind-matter dichotomy you incur a fundamental category mistake! Mind we know through direct experience, but a material world outside and independent of mind is a theoretical inference arising from interpretation of sense perceptions within a framework of complex thought, not an observable empirical fact.

>>16923052
The few relevant statements in your word salad can be used by any monist just by swapping a few words around, thus proving my point. Thanks for playing.

>>16923052
But explaining matter in terms of mind (idealism) is not epistemically symmetric with explaining mind in terms of matter (materialism) because mind and matter do not reside in the same level of explanatory abstraction. In fact, matter is the ground within which, and out of which, abstractions are made. Mind, in turn, is an abstraction of matter. This breaks the epistemic symmetry between them: we do not know mind in the same way that we know matter, for mind is an inference and matter a given. So what you've done is conflated abstraction with empirical observation

>>16923056
>In fact, matter is the ground within which, and out of which, abstractions are made. Mind, in turn, is an abstraction of matter
Can phenomenon be true or false?

>>16923058
Can abstraction be true or false?

>>16923059
Immediate collapse of the materialist. Unbelievable.

>>16923062
Why the chimpout? I just asked you a simple question that makes every bit as little sense as yours.

>>16923062
kek all i see is the immediate collapse of the idealist

>>16923072
so you admit your concession which I now accept. Thank you.

>>16923075
i concede that i saw >>16923058 getting owned by >>16923059 and falling apart immediately

>>16923081
So you admit dodging a question is tantamount to getting pwned and that the retarded materialist got pwned. And that you are also too stupid to see my disengagement as retroactively blowing you the fuck out.
Lets put it this way.
I accept your next concession as well.

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Ahhh the moldovan schizo has ensnared yet another victim, draining him of his precious mental energy

Is anyone else repulsed by how ugly bernardo kastrup is?

>>16923088
sorry, i don't care about your retarded argument, i just noticed you getting owned and kekt

>>16923088
>dodging a question
I didn't dodge your question. Your question is just a category error, which you probably realized once it got turned back on you, resulting in your ongoing meltdown. :^)

>>16923051
kastrup is a fucking moron kek

almost by definition metaphysics is not set up for empirical verification so the idea that the state of quantum theory or NDEs have somefing to say about consciousness is bullshit

>>16923039
>Any kind of Monism can make all of these claims just by swapping some words, including physicalism

phwoar

good post diss

why i am an ontological.illusionist

>>16923051
>then they saw the external world without using their eyes. But that makes eyes unnecessary
I'm not an Idealist but I don't see any inherent contradiction there if you believe reality and its laws are fundamentally mental constructs. You could easily argue that experiencing the world through a body grants the ability to interact with it physically, but also restricts knowledge-gathering to physical interactions, while being detached from the body makes you a direct witness but also a passive one. Maybe catsoup got mad because he has brainlet fatigue. Or maybe it doesn't mesh well with some aspects of his specific brand of Idealism, I don't know. Either way, it's a kidergarten gotcha, not really a challenge to Idealism at large.

>>16923109
This is the point of the question. The materialist is compelled to hold that phenomenon which are not true or false are responsible for the very construct you use to call the question a category error. Which, by definition, is itself a category error. See >>16923088
>I accept your next concession as well
As for your question about abstraction because you are an abysmal brainlet, a proposition is an abstraction and so abstractions can be true or false. You can't even recognize the differences in the questions. You better report to the police that you were raped, becase you are too stupid to understand what happened.

>>16923243
>phenomenon which are not true or false are responsible for the very construct you use to call the question a category error.
So?

>Which, by definition, is itself a category error.
>by definition
Where's the relevant definition?

>>16923243
>a proposition is an abstraction and so abstractions can be true or false.
Nonsentient token guesser "logic". You're conflating proposition itself as an object with what the proposition is saying.

>>16923247
Is that true?

>>16923250
Obviously, mouth breather.

>>16923251
Oh so the proposition can be true or false and I was right. Thanks for clarifying.

>>16923252
>the proposition can be true or false
Yes, mentally ill retard. As in the content of the proposition, not the proposition itself as an object. I like how you're getting filtered by this repeatedly, even after having it spelled out for you, and just keep committing the same category over and over. I guess you literally are a nonsentient token guesser.

>>16923195
>ou could easily argue that experiencing the world through a body grants the ability to interact with it physically, but also restricts knowledge-gathering to physical interactions, while being detached from the body makes you a direct witness but also a passive one.
The experience got committed to memory so it can be used to gain an advantage in the physical world.
Now that I think about it, even if you ignore the implications for idealism,the real answer has to be that these reports are just bullshit. If everyone had latent supervision, it would've evolved into something useful millions of years ago.

>>16923256
>even if you ignore the implications for idealism
Still waiting for you to derive any logical implications for idealism.

>>16923257
If organisms can just do the universal-mind-powered NDE vision trick, then eyes have no reason to evolve and yet they did.

>>16923259
Here's the video btw
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=6hKuzbIkOpQ

>>16923259
>If organisms can just do the universal-mind-powered NDE vision trick
You're not really an organism if you don't have a body. Are you sure you're not retarded? This is literally covered in the greentext you previously quoted.

>>16923266
And I refuted the argument with the first sentence of my reply

>>16923267
>the first sentence of my reply
... is self-evidently nonsense, given the actual content of NDEs. Are you SURE you're not retarded? Have you ever gotten tested?

>>16923270
The fact that the experience can be remembered means that it can change your behaviour which is all you need for it to have evolutionary impact.
It's very easy to understand.

>>16923283
>The fact that the experience can be remembered means that it can change your behaviour which is all you need for it to have evolutionary impact
You think nearly dying is a regular occurrence that someone should partake in every time they need a lifehack?

>>16923286
Eyes have evolved from literally nothing. NDE vision already works in extreme situations. Making that work consistently is childs play compared to evolving an entire eye.
Of course Kastrup also believes in telepathy, etc. without an NDE. Here it's even more unlikely that these things didn't evolve to become useful.

Ok, >>16923288 is very obviously a bot.

>>16923289
I accept your concession

>>16923253
Where did you spell out your nonsense? A phenomenon does not have a true or false value. The brain can come to true or false conclusions. Appeal to a category error is a refutation of materialism outright.

>>16923294
>A phenomenon does not have a true or false value
Neither does an abstraction. Let's see you get filtered again. :^)

>>16923292
>why doesn't a process that optimizes a physical body with respect to a physical environment exploit possibilities outside the physical framework
I concede that your mental retardation makes you unable to recognize your mistakes. You lack the capacity to concede because you're genetically deformed, not because you're making sense.

Test

>>16923297
You're still missing the point. These "possibilities outside the physical framework" left a memory, otherwise nobody could report the experience. They acquired information that the physical body can report on and potentially use for survival. If you deny that, then you have to deny the reports as a whole since non-physical experiences wouldn't leave a memory in the physical brain.

>>16923305
>These "possibilities outside the physical framework" left a memory
See >>16923286 then see >>16923297
>You lack the capacity to concede because you're genetically deformed, not because you're making sense.

>>16923306
>See >>16923286
My point still stands that it's much harder to evolve an eye from scratch. You probably forgot to reply to that in your brainlet rage

>>16923309
I'm pretty sure you're a hallucinating chatbot or a mentally ill retard at this point, but just for the record, I'll summarize exactly why you're wrong and retarded. Suppose that:

1. NDEs are true
2. The true substance of reality is mindlike

The physical world would then be a structure within the mental substrate. Evolution would be a part of that structure, optimizing physical bodies with respect to physical environments. An organism's phenomenology would be shaped by that structure and bound by it under normal conditions. You could suppose NDEs occur when that structure is in the process of breaking down, so the physical constraints that noramlly shape human phenomenology are loosened. Past a certain threshold, the structure breaks down irreversibly and you "die" (melting back into the formless mind substrate?), but until then, you're neither here nor there, i.e. neither completely disconnected from the body nor completely bound by its physical mode of witnessing the physical world.

Granted, this is made up bullshit, but unlike your argument, it's at least coherent. Your entire take boils down to:
>hurrrrrrrr, why doesn't a physical process of optimization just break down physics?
It's retarded. NDEs don't imply that possibility. Or at least not by any means short of nearly dying, which evolution obviously wouldn't favor.

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>>16920854

>>16923053
I mean , how do you know that for sure , if you can't understand anon.

>>16923182
>almost by definition metaphysics
I am a anon completely non involved in this current convesation but.

I wonder if that is true historically , it might just be that as we became more materialists because that seems to be prefered more and more over time , we just made our definitions closer to it , it might not be in certain definitions.

>>16924257
well thats the point innit

you can change your definitions to suit your metaphysics

to kastrup ndes mean some bullshit

to me

its just like neurons going mental

>>16920854
"Consciousness is not real" is just begging the question. You're flat out making the unreasonable demand to place faith in another that "you" are not truly experiencing anything at all lol.

>>16924434
>its just like neurons going mental
Whatever that means. Sounds like Kastrup is more coherent than you are.

>>16921117
>But its interesting to imagine what evolutionary benefit their might be for supposing ourselves to be sacred beings when we're actually just spasming bags of meat.
You're just a demoralized cretin.

>>16922374
This is the kind of schizophrenic bullshit monistcucks actually believe.